Oksana Torop, BBC News Ukraine
August 4, 2022
Leonid Kuchma, the second president of Ukraine, met the beginning of the war at home in Kyiv and did not leave anywhere during this time. He says he didn’t want to.
For a long time he headed the Ukrainian delegation at the negotiations in Minsk and, like no one else, knows about the mood and ambitions of the Russian authorities in the war. Today Leonid Kuchma openly draws analogies between the invasion of Russian troops and the fascists, says that since the time of the conflict on Tuzla in 2003 [a dispute over the ownership of the island of Tuzla in the Kerch region on the border of Russia and Ukraine] he had no illusions about “Putin’s Russia”, and I am sure that this time the Russian president made a huge miscalculation.
Kuchma led Ukraine twice from 1994 to 2005, while Putin concentrated power in his hands before his eyes. They have a long history of relationships and communication.
“First of all, you shouldn’t count on the fact that Putin is about to die,” advises the Ukrainian ex-president. At the same time, he is confident of Ukraine’s victory in this war. No compromises with Putin.
BBC News Ukraine managed to interview Leonid Kuchma for the first and so far only interview since the Russian invasion on February 24 of this year (in writing).
“I remained in Ukraine from the first day of the invasion”
BBC : Where did you meet the Russian invasion? Were you expecting him, were you in Ukraine at that moment?
Leonid Kuchma: Like most civilians in my country, the Russian full-scale invasion caught me in bed. This is probably the tradition of all fascists, regardless of country and era, to attack us at four in the morning… In the first days of the war, Russian fighters flew over our house, almost touching the roof.
I was immediately offered to evacuate abroad. I refused. We did not return to this issue again. I remained in Ukraine from the first day of the invasion.
Did I expect this? Not an easy question. Psychologically, as a person of my generation, I was ready for war – after all, as a child I experienced the first fascist occupation of my homeland.
I have also had no illusions about the aggressive nature of Putin’s Russia since 2003, when, during Moscow’s first attempt at encroaching on the Ukrainian Crimea, I gave the order to shoot to kill if the Russians tried to break into our island of Tuzla. And I understood the real level of the Russian threat, because I was well informed from various sources.
But, despite everything, the Russian invasion came as a shock to me. Probably, until the last moment I secretly hoped that the one who gave this inhuman order still had something human left.
BBC : In your opinion, could Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have been avoided?
Leonid Kuchma: When exactly? If in February, immediately on the eve of war, I think it could have been avoided only by agreeing to the terms of Putin’s ultimatum.
Then there would not be an invasion, but a gradual subjugation of our state, its planned occupation. And Bucha would then end up not only in Bucha, but throughout the country, everywhere the Russian occupier entered.
Would it be acceptable to avoid an invasion at such a cost? The answer, I think, is obvious. It seems that Churchill said after Munich that those who choose dishonor in order to avoid war will receive first dishonor and then war. I don’t think you could say it better.
The attack would have been impossible if we had been preparing to fight back all the years since the beginning of Russia’s creeping aggression. We developed and modernized our armed forces – truly, fully, comprehensively.
Yes, from the first minutes of the attack the Ukrainian army really shows itself as an army of heroes. Our soldiers destroyed not only the elite of the Russian army, but also the legend of its invincibility, showing the whole world that it was not even a legend, but a “Russian folk tale.”
But heroism can produce even more impressive results when it is supported by the latest technologies and modern weapons. During all seven relatively peaceful years after the Minsk agreements, the Ukrainian authorities had to prepare for an inevitable large-scale military clash with the Russian Federation. And in preparation for it, make maximum use of the unique personnel and production potential of the Ukrainian military-industrial complex.
I once had the honor of heading both legendary flagships of our rocket and space industry – the Yuzhmash production association and the Yuzhnoye design bureau.
These giants with a brilliant history could provide a reliable future for Ukrainian defense. But my heart bled when, in conversations with former colleagues, I heard about the state’s absolute indifference to this intellectual and technological treasure.
It would also be possible to somehow explain the lack of interest of the authorities in space – when the economic situation in the country is difficult, current interests can indeed be “mundane”. Well, okay, let’s say life is hard, and Ukraine has no time for space – but what about defense?! Being in a state of a latent hybrid, but real war, Ukraine desperately needed the latest powerful weapons! But there was no government order.
Meanwhile, the latest developments of the Dnieper team included positions that we today must “knock out” from our Western partners – for example, missile systems with a range of hundreds of kilometers.
And the point is not even that today we are asking for something that we could produce ourselves, but that the presence of weapons capable of hitting Russian territory to strategic depths could moderate the appetites of Putin’s Russia. It could. I myself created the weapons that ensured almost half a century of peace between the USA and the USSR, and I know what deterrence is. It really works.
This is one example of what could be done to contain the Kremlin, and this is only on the Ukrainian side. After all, the West also had great opportunities in this sense. The United States and the European Union have powerful leverage over Putin. And they should have been deployed before the invasion began. It was necessary to listen to our arguments and introduce sanctions preventively, as the Ukrainian leadership has repeatedly asked for.
I believe that Putin broke into our place because he did not believe that anyone would punish him for this. I didn’t believe that the West would unite in support of Ukraine, I didn’t believe in Western sanctions that could have an extremely negative impact on Russia.
Obviously, this was an unpleasant and painful surprise for him, which he does not know how to cope with. It is quite possible that, having received a preemptive sanctions warning and understanding the seriousness of the West’s intentions, Putin would have been afraid to order an offensive.
“Putin miscalculated”
BBC : In your opinion, what does Russia want and is it worth negotiating with Putin?
Leonid Kuchma: It seems to me that, in fact, if we talk about the emotional component, Putin today would like everything, like in a fairy tale, to unwind, to come back. So that February 24 doesn’t seem to happen.
After all, the blitzkrieg failed, and it failed as a result of Putin’s fatal miscalculation. That’s right – it was a fatal miscalculation in criminal plans, and not some kind of innocent “mistake” that those who want to “save face” for Putin talk about. Late. If you don’t open it, you won’t save it.
If we look from a more functional point of view, then Putin and his inner circle now want, first of all, to preserve their power, to guarantee that the Russian state will actually remain their property.
To do this, it is necessary that the foundations of the regime not be shaken. So that the Russian man in the street with delusions of grandeur gets his dose of the drug that creates that very virtual reality where he feels like the ruler of the world and a heroic winner.
What will the authorities sell him as a victory? Whatever they can do. The destruction of our infrastructure and our industrial potential, which will be passed off as “demilitarization.” The trial of the Azovites, which will be declared the very mythical “denazification”. Complete occupation of the so-called LDPR, a land corridor to Crimea, Dnieper water…
To summarize in one sentence, Putin wanted the destruction of the Ukrainian state, but will receive our rebirth. It is precisely this path that we are following today – through the establishment of a single Ukrainian nation, which has realized itself and is ready to fight for its own identity.
And regarding conversations with Putin. Recently, Foreign Minister Dmitry Kuleba formulated our position clearly: we will sit down at the negotiating table only after Russia’s defeat on the battlefield. That is, we will discuss exactly our conditions and our demands, and this is correct. And you can discuss them with anyone.
BBC : In your opinion, are the Ukrainian authorities doing everything right now?
Leonid Kuchma: No one can do everything right. But given the unprecedented extreme and criticality of the situation, the Ukrainian authorities are doing much more and much better than anyone could have imagined or expected of them before the Russian invasion.
Especially if at first they were seen only as amateurs, as, as far as I know, Putin treated our leaders. Another fatal miscalculation by the Kremlin. And I, in turn, am sincerely glad that back in the spring of 2019 I believed in the great potential and honesty of Vladimir Zelensky’s intentions and supported him.
I believe that the key to our victory is the unity of the people, the army and the authorities, a kind of “Ukrainian triad” that even the nuclear triad of the Russian Federation cannot overcome. Perhaps some of the president’s current decisions are causing controversy among different groups of society or political forces. But these, as they say, are details and details of the tactical level. But at the highest, strategic level, it seems to me that Zelensky is doing everything right.
It is right that he constantly appeals directly to various political institutions, cultural communities and expert elites around the world – and receives a fantastic reception and real support for Ukraine from them.
It is right that he does not interfere in the work of the military command, trusts our professional military leaders – and as a result, the Ukrainian army works wonders in the fight against a much stronger enemy.
- “I think the last head of Putin’s state has begun.” Boris Akunin about the war and “Real Russia”
- “This is not Putin’s war, but Russia’s.” German historian – about the collective responsibility of Russians and the experience of Germans
It is correct that, despite the absolute priority of military tasks, the implementation of anti-corruption programs is also a priority – and this is noted in the European Union as evidence of the correctness of our course towards gaining membership.
And most importantly: it is correct that from the first day the President and Supreme Commander-in-Chief remains in office, refusing any proposals to leave the capital. This alone was a very important factor in our surviving the difficult days and weeks of the invasion.
Today Zelensky is a very popular political figure in the world. And this is not only a powerful resource of global support for Ukraine, but also a criterion for the correctness of Zelensky’s own actions. It is unlikely that he would remain like this if he did something wrong.
About membership in NATO and the EU
BBC : The Ukrainian authorities openly accused NATO of delaying Ukraine’s membership in the alliance. In your opinion, should NATO be criticized in this way and should we now abandon the Euro-Atlantic course?
Leonid Kuchma: I hope that this is outdated information for you and that the question doesn’t exist today. By the way, I dedicated a special column to this very topic just this week, when it was the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Charter on a Special Partnership between Ukraine and NATO.
I feel personally responsible for these processes, since it was I who was given the honor of opening the Euro-Atlantic vector of Ukraine – first by signing the Ukraine-NATO Charter in 1997, and then, in 2002, by chairing the meeting of the National Security and Defense Council, at which Ukraine gained full membership in NATO for the first time defined as a strategic goal. Therefore, I very carefully and carefully monitor the dynamics of Ukrainians’ attitude towards the idea of joining the alliance.
So: only in the first weeks of the war there was a slight drop in support for the Euro-Atlantic course. And I connect this, firstly, with the assumption of accepting a neutral status in exchange for security guarantees at the beginning of negotiations with Russia.
Secondly, the painful reaction of Ukrainian society to NATO’s categorical refusal, precisely as an organization, to provide military assistance to Ukraine.
Time passed, and both factors were removed from the agenda. The idea of neutrality, which, by the way, was one of the points of the Russian ultimatum, as far as I know, is no longer being considered. After Russian atrocities and war crimes, no one will trust or give any binding guarantees to the Kremlin.
As for NATO assistance, I hope that during this time it has become obvious to Ukrainians that almost the entire volume of weapons we receive is provided by the alliance member countries. NATO’s refusal to intervene at the institutional level is evidence not of cowardice towards Moscow, but of responsibility towards each of the member countries.
The North Atlantic Alliance guarantees the security of all its members and will therefore avoid the risks of direct conflict with Russia. It’s a paradox, but such a position should even more encourage us to strive for full membership in order to become “our own” in NATO.
Personally, I do not see an alternative to NATO membership for Ukraine. But, it seems to me, now NATO is also strategically interested in the annexation of Ukraine, the largest European state with the most combat-ready army on the continent. This is all the more relevant given the fact that Russia is now officially recognized as NATO’s most serious threat.
BBC : Ukraine recently received candidate status for EU membership. How realistic do you think it is that it will join the European Union in the foreseeable future?
Leonid Kuchma: It greatly depends on how the war ends. It is unlikely that Ukraine will have much chance of this if it becomes a territory of frozen conflict and a “gray zone” between the West and Russia. The victorious Ukraine will probably move forward into the European Union quickly and successfully.
But what will the EU itself be like? Today, tectonic processes are taking place in the European community that could not have been imagined just yesterday.
I have been saying for a long time that the European Union cannot be effective when one single country can stop the joint decision of all the others. Especially considering the presence of members who are, to put it mildly, strangely positive towards Putin. And now at the highest level there are statements that it is time to reconsider the principle of unanimity in decision-making related to the foreign policy of the European Union. And it is important that this came from the lips of German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the head of one of the European countries with a truly decisive vote. I think this is absolutely true.
It is one thing to have a unanimous consensus at the beginning of the history of the European Community, when the EEC (one of the first names of the union was the BBC ) included only six like-minded countries. A “symphony orchestra” of 27 members, significantly different in terms of geography, history, and their political, economic and cultural interests, is completely different.
If the European Union changes precisely in this direction of gaining greater flexibility and efficiency, then I am sure that the process of our accession to the EU will become easier, and staying in it will bring much more strategic benefits to Ukraine.
What about the UN?
BBC : If we talk about the international community, is it doing enough today for Ukraine, which is at war with Russia?
Leonid Kuchma: This is a very multidimensional question. Which community exactly? If the one that is usually meant by the UN brand, then it does almost nothing. What is happening now with the UN directly reminds me of the fate of the League of Nations on the eve and at the beginning of the Second World War – the same helplessness, the same indecision, the same flirting with the aggressor.
I think that after our victory, after the victory of democracy over fascist-style authoritarianism, many international organizations will demand a radical change in format, because the current one does not work. The UN demonstrated complete ineffectiveness precisely when it should have acted most actively and decisively.
If you narrow your question to the help of the conditional Western community, then everything here is also ambiguous. The position of some countries, which, however, are not members of the EU or NATO, became an annoying disappointment for me.
I don’t want to name them specifically, but if in your own history there were incredibly terrible trials of genocide, then one would expect that you would show solidarity with the Ukrainian people, who have also been effectively declared a war of extermination! But no – ostrich pose, head in the sand…
I cannot help but name another country from this series – small North Macedonia, which recently decided to transfer its T-72 tanks to Ukraine.
This is a truly exciting event for me – it was I who, in 2001, at the request of my Macedonian friend and colleague, President Boris Trajkovski, decided to transfer armored vehicles and aircraft to this Balkan country.
This made it possible for the central authorities of Macedonia to respond to the armed rebellion of Albanian separatists and keep the country united. I perceive the current step of North Macedonia as a manifestation of not only value-based solidarity, but also gratitude to the Ukrainian people for the good done two decades ago. Agree, this rarely happens in big politics.
And secondly: after all, only the Ukrainian people and their army can do “enough” for victory; everything else can only be auxiliary in this.
“You shouldn’t expect Putin to die”
BBC : Do you see an end to this war ? How do you think it might end?
Leonid Kuchma: First of all, you shouldn’t expect that Putin is about to die. That sanctions are about to kill Russia economically. That the Russian average person will suddenly see the light and go out to an anti-war protest. Nothing like that will happen. Ukraine must fight and decide everything on the battlefield.
Of course, subconsciously we would all like the end of the war to come as quickly as possible, right now, because every moment another of our soldiers at the front, another child under Russian fire, could die. But I don’t think the war will end soon. The way Putin is feverishly gathering an army from prisons and weapons from eastern autocracies indicates that he still wants to chew out some kind of “victory.”
How can the war end? In conflicts in the modern, civilized world, they usually try to look for win-win solutions, an acceptable result when everyone wins to one degree or another, and there are no “outright” losers.
This is not our case. Putin brought too much grief, destruction and horror to our land. Hundreds of Ukrainian children were killed – I don’t know how to look for a compromise after this. The temperature has already been raised so that in this war there can only be one winner – and I believe that we will be that winner.
However, now the “acceptable result” for different parties is so different that even if there is good will – if we assume such a fantasy in relation to the Kremlin – there is almost no room for overlap.
It is unacceptable for Ukraine to leave its lands, and most importantly, its people, under occupation. It is unacceptable for the Russian authorities to look like failures and losers in the eyes of their population and the West, which is what, according to the Kremlin, withdrawal from the occupied lands would mean.
Moreover, each side is counting on its own strengthening. The further, the more Western weapons we will have, but the further, the more results of various mobilization measures and the transition of the economy to a military footing, Russia also expects to receive.
There are various factors that can radically affect the course and duration of the war – for example, the success of our announced counter-offensive to the South, the liberation of Kherson. And, on the contrary, the approach of a cold period without Russian gas supplies, the prospect of political crises and elections in the West – all this can also affect the timing of the ceasefire, but hardly in our favor.
Don’t forget that destroying the unity of Europe and the integrity of the Euro-Atlantic community is one of the Kremlin’s main goals. And Putin has more than one tool in his arsenal with which he is trying to do this – propaganda lies and manipulation, intimidation and blackmail.
Moscow is helped by the long-standing and significant corruption of Western elites with Russian money (Schroeder and Fillon are just the visible part of this iceberg), and the unwillingness of the “ordinary European” to dramatically lose in the level of comfort and well-being. We must realize that the West is a source of not only invaluable help for us, but also potential problems.
Probability of nuclear attack
BBC : How serious do you think the Russian officials’ threats of a nuclear strike are?
Leonid Kuchma: Threats with nuclear weapons are always serious. You can believe me as a person who devoted half his life to rocket development. Nuclear weapons are such a thing that everything that concerns them is always serious. I think you meant not so much the seriousness as the reality of these threats.
Regarding the specific forecast, I exclude the use of Russian strategic potential. I don’t believe this at all. A state can resort to strategic nuclear weapons only if there is a real threat to its very existence, or in response to an already inflicted blow, as a kind of “retribution from the other world.”
Russia can only use such weapons against the United States; these are the features of the placement and targeting of intercontinental missiles. But Putin, no matter what he says, knows perfectly well that the United States does not threaten him and will not strike him first. The use of strategic nuclear weapons means automatic retaliation and guaranteed death – there is even such a term in geopolitics as “mutually assured destruction.” Putin is not suicidal.
As for tactical nuclear weapons, here, unfortunately, the situation is more complicated. I would not rule out this danger. The fact is that a nuclear-free Ukraine is not able to respond adequately to Russia. Namely, the feeling of impunity has been the main driver of Putin’s actions for more than ten years.
If the state of affairs at the front threatens – no, not the existence or security of Russia, but exclusively Putin’s political positions and the stability of his regime – then the Kremlin may use tactical nuclear weapons.
Can this be prevented? I hope so. We cannot stop Putin here. But our Western allies, I think, can.
I have already said that the preventive introduction of sanctions could become a factor in deterring Russia from invading. I am confident that a clear warning to Putin from, for example, the United States about a military response to the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear Ukraine is also quite capable of stopping him.
And I do not rule out that such a warning has already been issued through direct communication channels. Because the stakes are too high. The chain reaction cannot be stopped not only in a bomb, but also in an escalation that gets out of control. Everyone says that after the Russian invasion the world will no longer be the same as it was. So, after the use of nuclear weapons, it may not exist at all.
BBC : Do you think that the world is on the verge of World War III ? That Russia, for example, could attack Lithuania or Poland? How realistic is this possibility?
Leonid Kuchma: When Hitler attacked Poland, no one knew that a world war was already underway. Depending on how Ukraine repels aggression, either the Third World War can be avoided, or it is already underway. If we resist, Putin will not go further. If not, I’m afraid that “to be continued.” But we will stand.
However, even if the geography of Russian aggression expands, I think the danger threatens, rather, not Lithuania or Poland, but the post-Soviet republics outside NATO. Allusions to Moldova and Northern Kazakhstan have already become commonplace, and now Georgia is also mentioned in this context. After all, Russia attacks only those who are several times weaker than it, or even better, weaker by an order of magnitude.
To pose a real challenge to NATO, especially having lost the most combat-ready part of your army, is, it seems to me, not about Russia. In a conventional war, NATO will grind the Russian army into powder; in a nuclear war, Russia will simply be destroyed. Will Putin start a war in which there will be two options – lose or die? A normal person would only give one answer. But this is normal…