Ill-Treatment of Ukrainian POWs

June 20, 2023
Life as Ukrainian P.O.W (NYT Interview with Former POWs)

November 15, 2022
United Nations Report: Ukraine / Russia: Prisoners of war

July 29, 2022
Olenivka prison massacre

From the October 2023 Report of the International Commission on War Crimes in Ukraine

On the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 February to 31 July 2023

D. Prisoners of war and persons hors de combat

“Each POW was beaten until losing consciousness, begging for mercy or pissing himself. One of the guards whispered to me: ‘Scream, it will help to stop the beating’.
There was a woman in the room. I think she was a nurse. She stayed in the room the whole time and said: ‘He has not passed out yet’. It was a signal for the guards to continue the beatings.”

– A Ukrainian POW about how he was tortured during his ‘admission’ to a SIZO in Donetsk

“There were several kinds of ‘sports’ that guards played. One was ‘football’ – they took a sledge-hammer and hit POWs on their legs.”

– A Russian POW on torture in a garage in Kramatorsk

Summary executions of POWs

  1. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented the summary execution of six men Ukrainian POWs, all of which occurred before the period covered by this report. No executions of Russian POWs during the reporting period were documented.
  2. In September 2022, a member of a Russian-affiliated armed group shot dead a Ukrainian POW whose leg was wounded after stepping on a mine while he was forced to perform dangerous labour near a frontline position. Another Ukrainian POW was shot dead when he refused to carry out the same dangerous labour.
    Both POWs were part of a group of Ukrainian POWs (all men) captured by Russian-affiliated armed groups in Donetsk region in August 2022. For three months, they were forced to carry heavy loads of ammunition and supplies to Russian frontline positions and to retrieve wounded Russian combatants. The POWs were exposed to mines and shelling without protection or body armour. POWs told OHCHR that at least five of them were injured while performing this labour. Forcing POWs to carry out dangerous labour is a violation of the Third Geneva Convention’s prohibition on engagement of POWs in works of military and dangerous nature.1
  3. On 9 March 2022, after taking control over the village of Sloboda, in Chernihiv region, Russian armed
    forces captured two Ukrainian servicemen hiding in a civilian building. On 31 March 2022, the bodies of the two servicemen were found with gunshot wounds.
  4. In addition to these cases, in two videos that appeared online on 6 March and 11 April 2023, members of Russian armed forces are seen torturing and summarily executing two Ukrainian POWs. In the first video, Russian servicemen shot dead a Ukrainian POW after he said “Glory to Ukraine”. In the second video, a Russian serviceman beheaded a Ukrainian serviceman. OHCHR has reasonable grounds to believe that both videos, which were likely recorded before the reporting period, are authentic.2
  5. Summary executions of POWs are grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and war crimes. In total, since 24 February 2022, OHCHR documented the summary execution or torture to death of 25 Russian POWs and 21 Ukrainian POWs (all men).

    Treatment of POWs
  6. During the reporting period, OHCHR interviewed 56 Ukrainian POWs (all men) who were released from captivity during prisoner exchanges between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, as well as 26 Russian POWs (all men) in official places of internment in Ukraine.3 OHCHR was provided confidential access to POWs interned by Ukraine and was able to conduct interviews in recognised places of internment. No access was provided to Ukrainian POWs in the hands of the Russian Federation.
  7. Most Ukrainian POWs interviewed by OHCHR spent in average six to seven months in captivity, with 22 of them interned for over 13 months. Out of 56, 51 were subjected to various forms of torture, ill-treatment, or sexual violence such as forced nudity and threats.4 Although OHCHR received reports about minor improvements, including an increase in the amount and quality of food provided to POWs, the overall conditions of internment remained dire.
  8. The Russian Federation continued to intern POWs in makeshift places of internment in Russian-occupied territory of Ukraine and in the Russian Federation.5 For instance, OHCHR documented the transfer of five Ukrainian servicemen to Chechnya, Russian Federation, where they were interned in police stations.
  9. With regard to Russian POWs, 12 of those interviewed were tortured during interrogations and evacuation before being brought to official places of internment. Moreover, Ukrainian authorities continued to use unofficial places of internment in violation of the obligation to officially record all POWs and give access to independent monitors. OHCHR received credible information that the Main Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine continued to run an unofficial place of internment for POWs in its quarters on Rybalskyi island in Kyiv.6 Three POWs told OHCHR that they had been held there for various periods of time between March 2023 and July 2023.7 OHCHR recalls that all POWs must be officially recorded, and independent monitors should have access to them. Ukrainian authorities did not respond to OHCHR’s queries regarding this facility, nor its requests to visit it.
  10. OHCHR recognises the efforts of the Government to improve the conditions of internment of Russian POWs. OHCHR observed that the administration of the POW camp in Lviv had addressed the concerns raised through public reporting and improved the treatment of POWs. In particular, the administration increased the portions of food and ceased former practices of using physical exercises as disciplinary sanctions and forcing POWs to sing Ukrainian songs before meals.

    Update on the explosions at the penal colony near Olenivka
  11. OHCHR continued to collect and analyse information regarding the explosions which killed at least 51 Ukrainian POWs and injured at least 139 (all men) during the night of 28–29 July 2022 at Volnovaska penal colony No. 120 near Olenivka8 in Russian-occupied territory of Donetsk region.9 More information is needed to establish the precise circumstances of and attribute responsibility for this incident, and OHCHR reiterates its calls to the Russian Federation to provide independent monitors access to the penal colony.10
  12. Based on interviews with more than 50 witnesses and survivors, as well as analysis of available video and photographic footage, OHCHR concluded that the explosions were not caused by HIMARS rockets, launched by Ukrainian armed forces. The degree of damages to the walls, ceiling, roof and windows of the barracks, the condition of the bunk beds inside, the size of the residual crater, and the impact radius are not characteristic of impacts by HIMARS ammunition.11 Even a single HIMARS rocket would likely have caused damage and destruction of the barracks and surrounding area of a significantly larger and more severe scale. In addition, witnesses described to OHCHR hearing multiple explosions.
  13. Video and photographic footage from the destroyed barracks appeared to show a point of impact on the interior of the western wall and two possible points of penetration through the roof. While the precise type of weapon and its point of origin could not be determined, the pattern of structural damage appeared consistent with a projected ordnance having travelled with an east-to-west trajectory.
  14. OHCHR recalls that under international law, a Detaining Power has a fundamental obligation to ensure humane treatment of POWs.12 Any act or omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering a POW in its custody is prohibited and a serious breach of the Geneva Convention.13 Russian armed forces began holding Ukrainian POWs at the colony in March 202214 which, at that time, was located 4.6 kilometres from the frontline.15 While the frontline shifted slightly over the next few months, it remained relatively close to the colony. On 28 July 2022, the colony held thousands of Ukrainian POWs16 and conflict-related detainees,17 and the distance to the frontline was approximately 14 kilometres.18 The close proximity of the colony to the frontline exposed POWs to dangers of the hostilities, contrary to the primary IHL provision on security of POWs.19
  15. Under IHL, in the event of any death or serious injury of a POW in their captivity, a Detaining Power has an obligation to carry out an immediate official investigation, which is effective, thorough and transparent.20 Should the inquiry indicate individual criminal responsibility for the death or injury of a POW, the Detaining Power must take all measures to ensure those persons are prosecuted.21
  16. The Office has not received information that the Russian Federation has carried out these obligations of investigation and prosecution.
  17. In particular, the scene of the explosions was not preserved in order to allow for a full and proper inspection and investigation by experts. Instead, the scene was contaminated and the physical evidence disturbed. Starting at 9:00 a.m. on 29 July, POWs were ordered to remove debris and dead bodies from the barracks and to clear pieces of corrugated tin sheets which had been blown from the roof.22 Further, at 11:00 a.m., members of the self-proclaimed ‘Donetsk people’s republic’ walked Russian journalists around the inside of the barracks to film. The journalists were shown fragments of purported HIMARS ammunition displayed on a bench outside the barracks. However, no such fragments were shown in situ.23
  18. The Russian Investigative Committee arrived at around 11:00 a.m. and at 12:17 p.m. announced it had opened a criminal case24 against Ukraine for carrying out the strike, allegedly with purported HIMARS rockets. This announcement was made before any expert analyses or autopsies could be performed or witnesses interviewed. Since 8 August 2022, no information has been published on the investigation by the Committee or other investigatory body of the Russian Federation.
  19. On 3 August 2022, upon request of both Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the United Nations SecretaryGeneral established a Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) tasked with ascertaining the facts of the incident. On 5 January 2023, the Spokesperson of the Secretary-General announced the decision to disband the FFM, noting the absence of conditions required for the deployment of the Mission to the site.25 The Russian Federation provided neither satisfactory assurances about secure access for the United Nations to visit the particular site, nor granted general requests by the UN Human Rights Office to access occupied areas of Ukraine.26
  20. 28 OHCHR was provided confidential access to POWs interned by Ukraine and was able to conduct interviews in recognised places of internment. No access was provided to Ukrainian POWs in the hands of the Russian Federation.

Footnotes

  1. Authorised types of work are spelled out in article 50 of the Third Geneva Convention. ↩︎
  2. HRMMU, Update on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, 1 February to 30 April 2023, June 2023. ↩︎
  3. OHCHR, Treatment of Prisoners of War and Persons Hors de Combat in the Context of the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation against Ukraine: 24 February 2022 – 23 February 2023, March 2023. Since February 2022, OHCHR interviewed 251 Ukrainian POWs (227 men, 24 women) and 249 Russian POWs (248 men, 1 woman). ↩︎
  4. Ibid, paras. 59 and 62. ↩︎
  5. Ibid, para. 42. ↩︎
  6. OHCHR has previously reported about this place. See OHCHR, Report on the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Persons Hors De Combat in the Context of the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation against Ukraine – 24 February 2022 to 23 February 2023, March 2023, para. 110. ↩︎
  7. After several days or weeks in this place, POWs were transferred to official places of detention. In some cases, however, the whereabouts of POWs who had allegedly been interned there could not be tracked. ↩︎
  8. The facility is located in Molodizhne village, near Olenivka town, in Volnovaskyi district of Donetsk region. ↩︎
  9. OHCHR previous findings can be found in OHCHR, Treatment of Prisoners of War and Persons Hors de Combat in the Context of the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation Against Ukraine, 24 March 2023, paras. 66-76. See also OHCHR, Türk decries lack of accountability for Olenivka killings, statement by the High Commissioner Volker Türk, 25 July 2023, at https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/07/turk-decries-lack-accountability-olenivka-killings (accessed on 15 September 2023). ↩︎
  10. OHCHR gathered detailed information through interviews with POWs who were present in the impacted barracks or elsewhere in the colony on the night of the incident, and from satellite imagery, video and photographic footage, media, government statements and open sources. ↩︎
  11. HIMARS ammunition (M31) is a high calibre (227 mm) weapon. It contains a 90 kg high explosive warhead with 23 kg of explosive content. Due to its explosive power, a single HIMARS rocket is highly devastating, significantly more than most rocket systems. ↩︎
  12. Third Geneva Convention, arts. 12(1) and 13(1). ↩︎
  13. Third Geneva Convention, art. 13(1). ↩︎
  14. Media Initiative for Human Rights,Crimes in Olenivka: Chronology, Testimonies and Names of Those Involved, 1 December 2022, at https://mipl.org.ua/en/crimes-in-olenivka-chronology-testimonies-and-names-of-those-involved/ (accessed on 15 September 2023) ↩︎
  15. Live Map Ukraine, 1 March 2022, at https://liveuamap.com/en/time/01.03.2022 (accessed on 15 September 2023). ↩︎
  16. Mainly Ukrainian servicepersons who were captured or surrendered during the siege of Azovstal in Mariupol. The barracks impacted by the explosions housed around 193 Ukrainian POWs ↩︎
  17. Mainly people who did not pass ‘filtration’. See OHCHR, Detention of civilians in the context of the armed attack by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, 24 February 2022 – 23 May 2023, June 2023, paras. 57-65. ↩︎
  18. Live Map Ukraine, 27 July 2022, at https://liveuamap.com/en/time/27.07.2022 (accessed on 15 September 2023). ↩︎
  19. ICRC Commentary of 2020 to Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, para. 23. ↩︎
  20. Third Geneva Convention, art. 121(1). For the investigation to be effective, the Detaining Power must take appropriate steps, employing all feasible means to establish the circumstances and cause of a POW’s death or injury. ICRC Commentary of 2020, para. 4661. ↩︎
  21. Third Geneva Convention, art. 121(3); General Assembly resolution 60/147 on “Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of IHRL and Serious Violations of IHL” (2005), para. 4; ICRC Commentary of 2020, paras. 4679-4681. ↩︎
  22. The POWs also described being ordered to keep silent about what they had seen in the barracks. ↩︎
  23. For proper investigation, any fragments should have been left intact and exactly as they had impacted the site. M31 HIMARS rockets produce a large amount of fragments spread over a considerable area of their impact. First-hand accounts from Ukrainian POWs regarding the characteristics of fragments they collected from inside the barracks further challenge the
    assertion that HIMARS rockets were used. ↩︎
  24. Under article 356 (“use of prohibited means and methods in armed conflict”) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. ↩︎
  25. Statement by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General at the daily press briefing on 5 January 2023, at https://press.un.org/en/2023/db230105.doc.htm (accessed on 15 September 2023). ↩︎
  26. OHCHR, Türk decries lack of accountability for Olenivka killings, statement by the High Commissioner Volker Türk, 25 July 2023. ↩︎